On August 21, 2001, China Securities Regulatory Commission formally released the Guiding Opinions on Establishing an Independent Director System for Listed Companies. For the first time, the proportion of independent directors, qualifications or conditions, nomination and election, terms of reference, remuneration and other issues were done Out of the detailed rules Although the law clearly stipulates, but in fact, the role of independent directors in China's listed companies did not fully play, and even the emergence of the so-called "vase directors", "human rights directors" and so on, resulting in the independence of independent directors , Independent directors did not play their due role. How can the listed company protect the rights and interests of the minority shareholders under the conditions of China's unique national conditions? How to solve the problems of insider control? How to avoid related party transactions? How to deal with market risks? This research tries to find out the reasons of the system by exploring the status quo of the independent director system of listed companies in China and how to solve the problem that the independent directors of listed companies in China play an incomplete role from the institutional level by comprehensively using various methods such as theoretical analysis and empirical research.